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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE INCREASING popularity of wireless portable devices, such as laptops, PDAs, wireless telephones or wireless sensors, has highlighted the importance of mobile ad hoc networks and ubiquitous computing. Nowadays, due to Internet service facilities and the convenience of portability, many people employ mobile networking in their professional and domestic activities.
Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is formed by a set of mobile hosts which communicate among themselves by means of the air. Those hosts establish dynamically the network without relaying on a support infrastructure and cooperate to forward data in a multi-hop fashion without a central administration [1] - [3] . MANETs were initially proposed for military applications and currently their use has been enlarged. Examples of application include emergency disaster relief, military battle field communication, sensing or controlling a region, sharing information during a lecture or conference, and so on [4] .
MANET's hosts must ensure functionalities and guarantees provided by support structures in wired networks. Routing, access control and node authentication are examples of network functionalities that must be performed by node coopera- tion. Nevertheless, those hosts present characteristics, such as constraint resources (processing, memory, bandwidth, energy and others), mobility and wireless communication that limit their capacity to execute dense activities and increase the complexity on providing network management, control and security. Due to their communication type and constraint resources, MANETs are vulnerable to diverse types of attacks and intrusions. Wireless communication, for example, is susceptible to interferences and interceptions. Portability has made devices each time smaller, with resource limitation, and thus easy targets for overload attacks [1] , [5] . The fully network decentralization, absence of support infrastructure and dynamic topology increase the vulnerability to many attacks such as impersonation, Sybil [6] , selective forwarding, blackhole, wormhole [7] , [8] , among others.
Many solutions have been proposed for security problems on ad hoc networks [1] , [3] , [8] , [9] . In general, these solutions apply preventive or reactive approaches using mechanisms to protect basic protocols or applications. Essentially, the solutions use specialized hardware, cryptographic primitives, mechanisms for overhearing neighbor communication or protocols designed for path diversity [10] . However, techniques and mechanisms are used for a specific goal, being effective to one given case, but inefficient to others. Moreover, all existent techniques and mechanisms are themselves incapable of individually defending against all types of attacks and intrusions.
Due to solution restrictions and MANETs characteristics, researchers have focused on designing security mechanisms for achieving network survivability. Survivability is commonly defined as the ability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures or accident [11] . The term system has a wide sense and could characterize networks, means of communication or services, and mission represents the abstract goals and requirements of the system.
The contributions of this survey are the following: (i) the contextualization of survivability to attacks, considering a design perspective resiliency-oriented; (ii) the proposal of a new classification of defense lines, suggesting that survivability to attacks can be reached when all defense lines work cooperatively; (iii) the identification of survivability key properties and requirements for MANETs; (iv) the investigation of survivable initiatives organized on three groups: route discovery, data transmission and key management. The survey concludes that current initiatives continue only using preventive and reactive mechanisms, being specialized to one network layer, protocol The rest of the survey is organized as follows. Section II defines survivable systems, presenting survivability concepts and key properties, as well as a classification of defense lines considering those concepts. Section III summarizes MANETs characteristics, security issues and conventional countermeasures. Section IV analyzes the survivability requirements for MANETs, taking into account their essential services. Section V describes and categorizes in three groups the survivable initiatives for MANETs. Finally, Section VI concludes the survey and gives future directions.
II. SURVIVABILITY CONCEPTS
In general, security mechanisms follow two defense lines: one preventive and another reactive [8] . The former provides mechanisms to avoid any type of attack, as firewalls and cryptographic systems. The latter consists in taking action on demand to mitigate intrusions, as intrusion detection systems (IDS). Nevertheless, preventive and reactive solutions are not efficient to put all attacks and intrusions off [12] , [13] . Thus, research groups have built security mechanisms toward one third defense line, called intrusion tolerance (IT) [13] , as illustrated in Figure 1 .
Tolerance approaches complement the other ones and its goal is to develop mechanisms to make systems (networks, means of communication, services and others) tolerant to attacks and intruders, that is, to afford some essential network services in the presence of malicious actions [13] - [16] . Systems using techniques for tolerating intrusions and attacks are called intrusion tolerance systems. In a broad sense, these techniques can provide certain survivability key properties, supporting the development of survivable systems.
Survivability refers to a system capability of completing its goals and requirements in a timely manner in face of attacks, intrusions, failures or accident [11] . Laprie et. al [17] consider survivability similar to dependability in terms of goals and addressed threats. Dependability goals consist in the system capability of delivering trusted services and avoiding the most frequent or severe failures. This work addresses survivability as a special case of dependability, where the network is able to complete its goals in the presence of malicious faults. These faults present different conditions and specific necessities that can only be efficiently treated when analyzed individually [16] .
Hence, survivability aims to increase security effectiveness, and assist dependability and security integration.
Making a parallel with dependability, intrusion tolerance applies fault tolerance mechanisms into the security domain. While survivability is a system capability, intrusion tolerance consists of techniques and mechanisms to offer correct services in the presence of intrusions [18] . Intrusion tolerance emerged with Fraga and Powell's initiative [19] , however, the development of such systems only had more attention in the last decade with MAFTIA (Malicious-and AccidentalFault Tolerance will be Internet Applications) [14] and OASIS (Organically Assured and Survivable Information System) [15] projects. The MAFTIA project has designed wide scale distributed systems to tolerate many ordinary faults and malicious attacks in fixed networks. The OASIS project was developed by American Department of Defense (DARPA) to build a tolerant system for high-speed networks.
Survivability attributes are reliability, availability, maintainability, confidentiality, integrity and safety [17] . Survivable systems address a subset of faults, called malicious or intentional faults, comprising of malicious logics and DoS attacks or intrusion [20] , [21] . In general, these faults abuse of existent system vulnerabilities, introduced accidentally or deliberately during the development of the system. An attack can successfully exploit system vulnerabilities resulting in an intrusion.
This work suggests that survivability should be reached by the use of preventive, reactive and tolerant approaches operating together. Figure 2 illustrates this behavior where preventive defenses will be the first obstacle for attacks, blocking certain ones and incapable of preventing others. Some attacks can succeed in intruding into system (or network) and reactive defenses will begin to work, trying to detect and stop them. However, reactive defenses have also limitations and intruders can be successful in compromising the system. In order to guarantee the system operation even in the presence of intrusions, intrusion tolerance techniques need to be applied, until preventive or reactive defenses can adapt themselves and take actions against the attack or intrusion.
The proposal of combining the three defense lines should be better explored taking into account survivability key properties and requirements for MANETs. Survivability requirements are identified in Section IV and the survivability properties are resistance, recognition, recovery and adaptability [16] . Resistance is the capability of a system to repel attacks. User authentication, firewalls and cryptography are examples of mechanisms used to reach it. Recognition is the system capacity to detect attacks and evaluate the extent of damage. Examples of recognition mechanisms are intrusion detection by patterns and internal system integrity verification. Recovery is the capability of restoring disrupted information or functionality within time constraints, limiting the damage and maintaining essential services. Conventional strategies applied for achieving recovery are replication and redundancy. Finally, adaptability is the system capacity of quickly incorporating lessons learned from failures and adapting to emerging threats [11] , [16] . Examples of adaptation techniques are the topology control by the radio power management and active networking technology. The application of active networking technology intends to allow the dynamic selection of MAC or network layer parameters, and the dynamic negotiation of algorithms and entire protocols based on application requirements or the communication environment [16] . Figure 3 illustrates the interaction among these key properties.
III. ISSUES AND MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY IN MANETS
MANETs are susceptible to many security issues. Characteristics as dynamic topology, resource constraint, limited physical security and no centralized infrastructure make those networks vulnerable to passive and active attacks [8] . In passive attacks, packets containing secret information might be eavesdropped, violating the confidentiality principle. Active attacks include injecting packets to invalid destinations, deleting packets, modifying the content of packets, and impersonating other nodes.
The classification of attacks by network protocol stack is the more frequent. Table I summarizes the main attacks for MANETs according to network layers. Some attacks are also categorized as byzantine or misbehavior attacks, being generated by network node whose actions cannot be trusted or do not conform to protocol specifications. Blackhole, wormhole, rushing, Sybil, sinkhole, HELLO flooding and selective forwarding are examples of byzantine attacks. Moreover, these attacks are also related to selfishness problem. The goal of a selfish node is to make use of the benefits of participating in the ad hoc network without having to expend its own resources in exchange [22] .
Researchers have actively explored many mechanisms for securing mobile ad hoc networks. These mechanisms are based essentially on customized cryptographic primitives, protocols for path diversity, protocols that overhear neighbor communication, and protocols that use specialized hardware [10] .
Cryptographic primitives have been used to provide authentication, integrity and confidentiality of secure routing protocols [25] - [27] . In general, HMAC (message authentication code used for authentication [28] ), digital signatures and symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic operations are applied with these purposes. However, this mechanism generally increases the network overhead. MANET constraint resources prevent the usage of complex encryption methods. Furthermore, no existence of infrastructure and dynamic topology increase the difficulty for the key management and distribution, and mainly these mechanisms cannot defend against internal attacks.
Path diversity techniques aim to increase route robustness by discovering multipath routes and using these paths to provide redundancy in data transmission [10] , [29] , [30] . Multipath routing protocols can use all routes found simultaneously and transmit the same data more than one time; or can use them on demand, as an alternative. However, many of those protocols do not apply mechanisms to authenticate intermediary nodes in routes, making them vulnerable to impersonation and Sybil attacks.
Techniques for monitoring neighbor communication and behavior in wireless channel have been proposed to detect and minimize misbehaving nodes [10] , [31] - [34] . Generally, these techniques assume that wireless interfaces support promiscuous mode operation. Promiscuous mode means that if a node A is within range of a node B, it can overhear communications to and from B even if those communications do not directly involve the node A. By means of this mechanism, nodes can monitor others and announce those that have misbehavior as dropping or tampering packets.
Finally, hardware, as GPS (global position system) [35] or directional antennas, has been used to help in preventing and detecting wormhole attacks [36] , [37] . Pering et. al, for example, introduce the notion of packet leash as a general mechanism for detecting and defending against them [26] . A leash is any information added to a packet and designed to restrict its transmission distance. Leashes are classified as geographical or temporal. A geographical leash ensures that the recipient of the packet is within a certain distance from the sender, and to take localization positions, the GPS can be used. In [37] , a directional antenna scheme was proposed to also detect those attacks. The scheme restricts the communication among nodes based on distance information, which is calculated according to received signals. Unfortunately, these schemes are specific to wormhole attacks.
IV. SURVIVABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR MANETS
MANETs introduce diverse functions, operations and services influenced by the context, applications and basic characteristics. In a critical situation, where parts of a system are compromised by attacks or intrusions, priority is given to maintain correct functionality of essential services. Essential services demand capacities and guaranties to assure their correct delivery in the presence of attacks, failures or multiple fake identities will be created for adversary nodes, meaning that an attacker can appear to be in multiple places at the same time Rushing adversaries quickly forward their route request (RREQ) messages when a route discovery is initiated, in order to participate any route discovery. This attack can be carried out against on-demand routing protocols, as AODV [23] , DSR [24] and others Transport SYN Flooding classic TCP SYN flood where an adversary sends many connection establishment requests to a target node, overwhelming its resources accidents. Such capacities and guaranties are identified as survivability requirements and they can diverge significantly depending on the system characteristics, its scope, and the consequence of the service interruption. Despite of Linger et. al [38] define those requirements in terms of essential and non-essential services, this section discusses survivability requirements for MANETs considering essential services and network characteristics.
Essential services in MANETs can be classified in two types: specific services and general services. The former represents those services designed by application or network context. The latter denotes fundamental services that are independent of applications or context as routing, connectivity and communication. Since specific services can vary with application or context, this work analyzes the survivability requirements related to general services. Survivable MANET's must maintain a connected network even in adverse situations, since that service allows efficient routing and end-to-end communication. Consequently, survivable networks must (i) consider node heterogeneity balancing their operations and tasks among the network nodes; (ii) be able to change dynamically the parameters of the connections such as node's addressing and service discovery (self-configurable); (iii) be able to adjust transmit powers of nodes adaptively in response to mobility, activity requirements such as QoS level, environmental conditions and attacks (selfadaptation); and (iv) use node's energy and other resources efficiently when the system suspects that it is under attack (efficiency).
Routing is another essential service whose cooperative way of work brings many security weaknesses. Hence, survivable networks need to apply mechanisms to (i) control the access of nodes in the network (access control); (ii) protect the wireless communication at physical and data link layers as well as user/data acquisition (protection); (iii) guarantee integrity, confidentiality and authentication principles; (iv) offer ro-bust and efficient routing; and (v) tolerate attacks by means of intrusion tolerance techniques such as redundant approaches -multipath, double routing protocol and others (redundancy).
Communication is the main purpose of any network, and security or mobility issues make MANET's communication a challenge. In this way, its survivability requirements consist of (i) designing protocols that work normally on different and adverse conditions (self-adaptation); (ii) making functional end-to-end communication without needing a reliable return channel for acknowledgments; (iii) using multiple communication channels (redundancy); (iv) proceeding during eventual disconnection and along with partial segments of paths (robustness). Table II summarizes MANETs survivability these requirements taking into account the general services.
Certain survivability requirements are consequence of network characteristics. Survivable systems for MANETs can not have the central point of failures/attacks. They must be fully decentralized and they must achieve the necessary organizational structures without requiring human intervention (self-organization). Survivable MANETs must be scalable to consider the great variability on the total number of nodes and the dynamic topology. They must also be self-managed and self-controlled, that is, autonomic to guarantee network functionality and efficiency.
Survivable MANETs must be self-diagnosed monitoring themselves and finding faulty, unavailable, misbehavior or malicious nodes. They must also prevent disruptions or recover from problems that might have happened and find an alternative way of using resources and reconfiguring the entity to keep in normal operation (self-healing). Survivable networks must finally manage themselves in order to optimize the use of their resources, minimizing latency and maintaining the quality of service. Figure 4 illustrates the integration among all mentioned requirements, highlighting those yielded by general essential services (light gray) from those produced by network characteristics (dark gray). The requirements dependent of the context or application are not considered, making this incomplete view in the figure.
Each requirement, as depicted in Figure 4 , is connected to others that together can improve the network survivability. Robustness, for example, will be more effective for survivability when redundancy, access control and protection are also applied. Protection is often reached by authentication, integrity and confidentiality. Access control applies generally authentication mechanisms and self-controlling characteristic enhances it. Scalability requirement will be reached by means of self-management, self-organization and self-controlling. These integrations only illustrate some possibilities for together improving the survivability, without extinguishing all of them.
Nowadays, each essential service in Table II , connectivity, routing and communication, is treated and associated to three different layers, respectively, link, network and application layers. This is not sufficient for archieving a complete survivable system due to multi-layer attacks. Further, the use of multi-layer information can make security mechanisms more robust, resistant and survivable. Routing layer, for example, can use energy or bandwidth information present in link layer to take better choices and to be more adaptive. Routing layer can inform the others about attack detection and in this way, those layers can start an alert procedure. In summary, the survivability existent on the layers can mutually provide guarantees and support.
Based on these previous considerations and on the survivability key properties presented in Section II, we identified three view planes for survivable systems, as illustrated in Figure 5 . In the first one (key properties), we have the properties that must be achieved by the system. In the second one (requirements), we highlight the requirements that survivable systems need to reach. Finally, in the third one (protocol layers), we emphasize that all network layers need to be addressed by the system. We note that a complete survivable system attends these three planes.
V. SURVIVABLE INITIATIVES FOR MANETS
This section describes several initiatives on building survivable mobile ad hoc networks. Despite that many of them do not present a complete survivable proposal, they have goals, characteristics and mechanisms more correlated to properties and requirements of survivability than just preventive or reactive schemes. Since some papers survey conventional security defense lines [3] , [9] , [39] , [40] , this work focuses on security propositions that aggregate more than one defense line and apply some technique of tolerance as redundancy or recovery.
Initiatives found in the literature are categorized on three main groups: route discovery, data forwarding, and key management and access control. The route discovery group consists of approaches trying to make route discovery phase of routing protocols more resistant and tolerant to different kinds of attacks and intrusion. The data forwarding group is composed of initiatives specialized on data forwarding using preventive or reactive security schemes and some tolerance techniques, as redundancy. The last one includes cryptographic key management and access control approaches built to be more tolerant to attacks.
A. Route discovery
Routing is essential for the correct operation of MANETs, and many routing protocols have been proposed in the literature, including proactive (table-driven), reactive (demanddriven), and hybrid solutions. Most of the existing protocols have assumed MANETs as a trust environment. However, as shown in previous sections, MANETs are highly vulnerable to attacks due to their characteristics.
Secure routing protocols have been proposed [26] , [27] , [41] , such as SRP [29] , SAODV [42] , SAR [43] . These secure protocols are mostly based on authentication and encryption algorithms, being inefficient to put all intruders and attacks off. In this way, some research groups have built intrusion tolerant routing approaches, such as TIARA (Techniques for Intrusion-resistant Ad Hoc Routing Algorithms) [44] , BFTR (Best-Effort Fault Tolerant Routing) [45] , ODSBR (An OnDemand Secure Byzantine Routing Protocol) [46] and BA (Boudriga's Approach) [47] . In the FLAC technique, distributed wireless firewall and a limited resource allocation are applied together to control packet flows and to prevent attacks based on resource overload. Each node participating in the ad hoc network contains an access control list, where authorized flows are defined. A threshold is defined for allocating limited amount of network resources for a given flow. Many routes are discovered and maintained, but only one route is chosen to data forwarding.
The flow monitoring technique checks the network failures sending periodic control messages, called flow status packets.
If a path failure is identified, an alternative path found in the discovery phase will be selected. The authentication process in TIARA consists in placing the path label of the packet in a secret position. Each node can define a different position for the label within the packet being its authentication information.
2) BFTR:
Best-effort fault-tolerant routing (BFTR) is a source routing algorithm exploring path redundancies of ad hoc networks. Its goal is to maintain packet routing service with high delivery ratio and low overhead in the presence of misbehaving nodes. BFTR never attempts to conclude whether the path, or any node along it, is good or bad. It takes into account existing statistics to choose the most feasible path, such as each one with the highest packet delivery ratio in the immediate past. By means of existing statistics and receiver's feedback, different types of attacks can be indistinctly detected such as packet dropping, corruption, or misrouting.
BFTR is based on DSR flooding to retrieve a set of paths between source and destination nodes, whenever necessary, R e s is t a n c e E tc . S e lf -m a n a g e m e n t S e lf -o r g a n iz a ti o n D e c e n tr a li z a ti o n and it chooses initially the shortest path to send packets. If a route failure is reported, the protocol will discard the current routing path and proceed with the next shortest path in the route cache. The algorithm considers that the behavior of any good node is to delivery packets correctly with high delivery ratio. In this way, a good path consists of nodes with high delivery ratio. Any path with low delivery ratio is thus discarded and replaced by the next shortest path. BFTR requires no security support from intermediate nodes. The source and destination nodes of connections are assumed wellbehaved. A previous trust relationship between end nodes is required, being possible the authentication between them during data communication.
3) ODSBR:
ODSBR is a routing protocol that intends to provide a correct routing service even in the presence of Byzantine attacks [48] . ODSBR operates using three sequential phases: (i) least weight route discovery, (ii) Byzantine fault localization and (iii) link weight management. The first phase is based on double secure flooding and aims to find lowest cost paths. Double flooding means that route discovery protocol floods with route request and response messages in order to ensure path setting up. In this phase, cryptography operations guarantee secure authentication and digital signature. The second phase discovers faulty links on the paths by means of an adaptive probing technique. This technique uses periodic secure acknowledgments (acks) from intermediate nodes along the route and the integrity of the packets is assured by cryptography. The last phase of ODSBR protocol manages the weight assigned to a faulty link. Each faulty link has a weight to identify bad links, being this information stored at a weight list and used by the first phase of the protocol.
Results have shown the good performance of ODSBR in many scenarios for different metrics. However, some important points are not evaluated or well defined. For example, ODSBR assumes the use of RSA cryptography and digital signatures without considering open issues as public key distribution, node pair key initialization or the iteration among nodes to guarantee authenticity. These operations are essential for the good ODSBR functionality and can influence the results.
Moreover, it is based also on acknowledgments that could not be assured due to mobility and dynamic topology.
4) Boudriga's approach (BA):
Boudriga et. al [47] propose a new approach for building intrusion tolerant MANETs. It consists of a multi-level trust model and a network layer mechanism for resource allocation and recovery. The multilevel trust model assumes that the network is divided into two virtual sets: the resource's domain and the user's domain. Each resource assigns a unique trust level for each type of activity that it is involved with and each location where it appears. Based on this trust level and on the activity, users or applications allocate resources by a distributed scheme. It allocates available resources attempting to maximize the use and minimize costs. For each application, only a fraction of a resource is allocated at a given node.
Intrusion tolerance is reached through a distributed firewall mechanism, a technique for detecting and recovering intruderinduced path failures, a trust relation between all nodes, an IPsec-based packet authentication, and a wireless router module that enable survivability mechanisms to DoS attacks. The distributed firewall aims to protect the MANET against flooding attacks and each node maintains a firewall table containing the list of all packets passing through it and successfully accepted by their destination. After a handshake between the sender and the receiver of a related flow, the entries in a firewall table will be maintained automatically and refreshed when failures, intrusion occurrences or other abnormal behavior are detected. Based on those entries, the node can forbid any flood of spurious traffic. Three parameters are managed by the nodes to detect anomalies such as packet loss rate, duplicate packet rate and authentication failure rate.
B. Data forwarding
Some works have proposed secure routing mechanisms to defend against several attacks [10] , [32] - [34] . Despite of those protocols ensure the correctness of the route discovery, they can not guarantee secure and undisrupted delivery of data. Intelligent attackers can easily gain unauthorized access to the network, follow the rules of the route discovery, place themselves on a route, and later redirect, drop or modify traffics, or inject data packets. In a nutshell, an adversary can hide its malicious behavior for a period of time and then attack unexpectedly, complicating its detection. For these reasons, mechanisms to provide data confidentiality, data availability and data integrity are necessary for guaranteeing secure data forwarding.
Several mechanisms have been proposed for securing data forwarding. Lightweight cryptographic mechanisms as Message Authentication Code (MAC) [28] , for example, are used to data integrity. Nuglets [49] , Friends and Foes [50] , Sprite [51] and others [52] , [53] propose mechanisms to stimulate node participation in data forwarding, trying to guarantee data availability. CORE [54] and CONFIDANT [55] are examples of reputation systems that provide information to distinguish between a trustworthy node and a bad node. This information also encourages nodes to participate in the network in a trustworthy manner.
Some solutions to provide data confidentiality and data availability have attempted to apply techniques as redundancy and message protection to be more resilient to attacks. In SPREAD [56] , SMT [57] and SDMP [58] , for example, the message is divided into multiple pieces by a message division algorithm. These pieces are simultaneously sent from the source to the destination over multiple paths. In [59] , a crosslayer approach is investigated to improve data confidentiality and data availability, using directional antennas and intelligent multipath routing with data redundancy.
1) SPREAD:
The Secure Protocol for Reliable Data Delivery (SPREAD) scheme proposes the use of some techniques to enhance data confidentiality and data availability. Initially, messages are split into multiple pieces by the source node, using the threshold secret sharing scheme. Each piece is encrypted and sent out via multiple independent paths. Encryption between neighboring nodes with a different key is assumed as well as the existence of an efficient key management scheme. SPREAD focuses on three main operations: to divide the message, to select multiple paths and to allocate message pieces into paths.
Messages are split by the threshold secret sharing algorithm [60] and each piece is allocated into a selected path aiming to minimize the probability of harm. SPREAD selects multiple independent paths taking into account security factors such as the probability of being compromised. The goal of SPREAD is to achieve an optimal share allocation way, where the attacker should damage all the paths to recover the message.
2) SMT: The goal of the secure message transmission (SMT) protocol is to ensure data confidentiality, data integrity, and data availability, safeguarding the end-to-end transmission against malicious behavior of intermediary nodes. SMT exploits four main characteristics: end-to-end secure and secure feedback mechanism, dispersion of the transmitted data, simultaneous usage of multiple paths, and adaptation to the network changing conditions. It requires a security association (SA) [61] between the two end communicating nodes, so no link encryption is needed. This trust relationship is indispensable for providing data integrity and authentication of end nodes, necessary for any secure communication scheme.
The two end nodes make use of a set of node-disjoint paths, called Active Path Set (APS), being a subset of all existing paths between them.
Data message is broken into several small pieces by the information dispersal scheme [62] . Data redundancy is added to allow recovery, being also divided into pieces. All pieces are sent through different routes existent in APS, enhancing statistically the confidentiality and availability of exchanged messages. At the destination, the dispersed message is successfully reconstructed only if a sufficient number of pieces are received. Each piece carries a Message Authentication Code (MAC), allowing its integrity verification by the destination. The destination validates the incoming pieces and acknowledges the successfully received ones thought a feedback to the source. The feedback mechanism is also protected by cryptography and is dispersed to provide fault tolerance. Each path of APS has a reliability rate calculated by the number of successful and unsuccessful transmissions on this path. SMT uses this rate to manage the paths in APS, trying to determine and maintain a maximally secure path-set, and adjusting its parameters to remain effective and efficient.
3) SDMP: The Secured Data based MultiPath (SDMP) protocol exploits also multiple paths between network nodes to increase the robustness and data confidentiality. The protocol assumes Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) link encryption/decryption of all the frames between neighboring nodes, which provide link layer confidentiality and authentication. SDMP can work with any routing protocol which provides topology discovery and supports the use of multipath for routing. SDMP distinguishes between two types of path: signaling and data. Signaling type requires only one path of the path-set existent between source and destination nodes, being the other paths available for data transmission.
The protocol divides the message into pieces using the Diversity Coding approach [63] . Each piece has a unique identifier and all of them are combined in pairs through an XOR operation related to a random integer number. Each pair is sent along a different path. All information necessary for message reconstruction at the destination is sent by the signaling path. Unless the attacker can gain access to all of the transmitted parts, the probability of message reconstruction is low. That is, to compromise the confidentiality of the original message, the attacker must get within eavesdropping range of the source/destination, or simultaneously listen on all the paths used and decrypt the WEP encryption of each transmitted part. However, it is possible to deduce parts of the original message from only a few of the transmitted pieces, especially since one piece of the original message is always sent in its original form on one of the paths.
4) Cross-layer approach (CLA):
In contrast to previous solutions, a cross-layer approach is investigated in [59] . The solution uses directional antennas and intelligent multipath routing to enhance end-to-end data confidentiality and data availability. Unlike an omni-directional antenna that transmits or receives radio waves uniformly in all directions, a directional antenna transmits or receives radio waves in one particular direction. Directional antennas make eavesdropping more difficult and reduce the areas covered by packet transmissions, minimizing the overlap of message pieces sent by multiple paths. Thus, the use of directional antennas is justified by the reduction on the likelihood that an adversary is able to simultaneously gather all of the message pieces at the source or destination nodes.
A self-adaptive transmission power control mechanism is used together with directional antennas to reduce the message interception probability. This mechanism allows the transmitter to use only enough transmission power in order to reach the intended receiver, minimizing the radiation pattern for a given radio transmission and the possibility of an attacker to intercept the message transmission. Dynamically the transmission power is adjusted depending of the data packet type exchanged between neighboring nodes. Multipath routing is also used. Thus, messages are divided based on threshold secret sharing algorithm, and then the shares are sent by multiple node-disjoint paths. Two intelligent routing schemes are proposed to reduce message interception probability. The former minimizes the physical distance of hops and the latter minimizes the path-set correlation factor.
C. Key management and access control
Security solutions have relied on cryptography and suppose the existence of an infrastructure for providing and managing keys. Some MANET's characteristics, as the lack of any central infrastructure, make key management a challenge. Despite of this, distributed and self-organized key management system for MANETs have been proposed. Basically, there are two types of key infrastructure [3] , [9] . The first involves the private key infrastructure, which establishes common private keys used for symmetric cryptography, such as symmetric group keys used for securing group communications. The second considers the public key infrastructure, which provides a couple of keys (public/private) used for asymmetric cryptography, as in digital signatures. This subsection addresses the most relevant survivable key management initiatives.
1) PGP-like (PL):
One of the survivable key management initiatives for MANETs is called PGP-like [64] . This system handles the public key management problem and proposes a fully distributed self-organizing public key management infrastructure. PGP-like (PL) is based on the PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) functionality [65] and each node is responsible for creating its public and private keys. Unlike PGP, where certificates are mainly stored in centralized certificate repositories, certificates in PGP-like are stored, distributed and managed by the nodes in a fully self-organized manner. In this system, key authentication is performed via chains of publickey certificates.
As public and private keys are created locally by a node itself, public-key certificates are issued based on the existing trust among the nodes. In this way, if a node x believes that a given public key belongs to a node z, then x can issue publickey certificate in which K z is bound to z by the signature of x. Initially, each node holds in its repository certificates issued by it and the certificates that other nodes issued to it. PGPlike defines a mechanism that provides periodic exchanges of certificates between neighbor nodes. This mechanism aims to distribute the certificates and become more efficient to find a chain of public-key certificates. Moreover, mechanisms to update and to revoke keys are used to prevent conflicts. PGPlike presents also functionalities to deal with misbehavior nodes, such as operations to cross-check the keys in certificates and detect inconsistencies. The certificates are inconsistent when two or more of them are related to the same user, but they present different keys or relate the same public key to different users.
2) Joshi's approach (JA): Joshi et. al propose a fully distributed certificate authority scheme based on secret sharing and redundancy [66] . In secret sharing mechanism, the certificate authority's private key is first divided into parts. These parts or key shares are then distributed among the nodes in the network. To communicate, nodes have to recreate the key. The certificate authority (CA) key can be recreated by combining a minimum number of key shares from the total number of shares. The critical situation is when the number of nodes required to recreate the key are not found in the communication range of the node trying to communicate.
The number of key shares per node is more than one by incorporating redundancy into the network. Since each node stores more than one key share, then the number of nodes required to recreate the CA key is reduced, increasing the chances of a legitimate node for recreating the CA key. On the other hand, the redundancy poses a challenging since the chances of an intruder entering in the network and compromising the CA key are increased. When an intruder accesses the network and compromises one node, it becomes as good as a valid node. To overcome this problem, it is proposed the use of a intrusion detection system (IDS), which should identify the misbehavior/compromised nodes and remove them from the network.
3) URSA: URSA is a ubiquitous, decentralized, selfcontrolled and robust access control solution for mobile ad hoc networks, where no single node monopolizes the access decision or is assumed to be completely trusted [67] . Instead, multiple nodes jointly monitor a local node and certify/revoke its ticket. Tickets perform the same functionality of conventional digital certificates, having expiration time, personal public key of the node, signature and identifier. They are certificated and updated periodically to resist conspiracy of attacks by multiple misbehavior nodes. Certifications are based on RSA cryptosystem [67] and on threshold cryptographybased signature [60] . URSA handles a localized group trust model where a node is considered trust if it is trusted by a number of reliant nodes. The trust relation is defined within a certain interval limited by the ticket expiration time. Based on this model, trust nodes can sign tickets for all other nodes in the network. These nodes also monitor other nodes in order to detect possible misbehaviors. If a misbehavior node is detected, ticket revocation can be done to prevent the attack propagation. Tickets are also periodically renewed to improve the resilience of the system.
Other works follow the same idea of URSA and apply threshold approach as [5] and [68] . Although they present similar characteristics to URSA, they deal with a public key management problem. In fact, Zhou and Haas [5] are the first to address public key management in MANET, and also applied threshold approach to make it decentralized and robust. Table III correlates the initiatives presented in this section with survivability properties. Table IV summarizes the requirements achieved by each survivable initiative and Table V reviews the main techniques applied, the protocol stack layer that is affected, the dependence on a protocol and the attacks addressed by each initiative.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of MANETs has increased and, consequently, the security issues have become more important. Traditional defense lines are not sufficient for such networks, since they present different characteristics and properties that require new approaches. This article introduced survivability concepts and its correlation with preventive, reactive and tolerance defense lines. Survivable MANETs will be able to fulfill their goals (even in the presence of attacks or intrusions) by means of the cooperation among those three defense lines.
Key properties of survivability as resistance, recognition, recovery and adaptability were detailed, and survivability requirements for MANETs were analyzed. Those requirements comprise self-organization, self-control, self-configuration, self-management, access control, protection, authentication, scalability, redundancy and others.
Existent survivable initiatives were categorized in three groups: route discovery, data transmission and key management. Furthermore, these initiatives were described emphasizing their survivability requirements and properties. Based on this investigation, we can conclude that (i) security solutions for MANETs still apply a few set of preventive and reactive techniques; (ii) solutions focus either on attacks or only one layer of the stack protocol; (iii) adaptability property is almost unexplored; (iv) requirements as heterogeneity, efficiency, robustness and self-management are not yet reached.
Finally, this work highlights that a fully survivable MANET should apply cooperatively the three defense lines instead of only one or two lines independently. Futher, it should consider a multi-layer and multi-attack solution, beyond being heterogeneous to diverse environments and adaptable on the fly to unexpected situations. 
